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The Uncertain Role of Innocence in
United States Efforts to Deport
Nazi War, Criminals

In the thirty years following World War II, the United States was a safe
haven for Nazi war criminals.' During this time, the U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) prosecuted only one alleged war criminal. 2 Responding partly to Congressional outrage over INS inaction,
the Attorney General in 1978 created the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to prosecute war criminals. 3 This special Justice Department office has launched scores of prosecutions, resulting in the
denaturalization of many individuals, the deportation of several, and the
probable denaturalization and deportation of many more now wending
their way through the appellate process. 4 Since most of these defendants originate from the Soviet Union, they also face a probable death
sentence upon deportation. According to one report, the OSI is investigating over 300 individuals. 5
Although bringing Nazi war criminals to justice is a laudable goal,
serious flaws exist in the current program. Defendants in denaturalization proceedings receive a level of due process inferior to that accorded
defendants in criminal trials. 6 Even more serious, the present procedures never allow the accused a right to trial on the merits of the war
crimes charge, focusing instead upon the illegal procurement of citizenship. Thus, even a defendant whom the government cannot prove guilty
may be stripped of citizenship and deported to face a death sentence.
1. This situation has caused considerable embarrassment for the United States.
The Soviet Union, for instance, charged that western countries were harboring Nazi
war criminals and refusing to extradite them. See generally United States v. Kungys,
571 F. Supp. 1104, 1125 (D. NJ. 1983), aft'd, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 107 S.Ct. 431 (1986).

2. The INS was unsuccessful in this single prosecution attempt. See infra note
99; cf. notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
3. Infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
4. In 1984, approximately 35 cases were reportedly being litigated. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 15, 1984, at A3, col. 1. Many more prosecutions have begun since that time,
but this author did not investigate the number. For lists of cases in progress or being
newly initiated, see newsletters of Americans for Due Process, P.O. Box 85, Woodhaven, NY 11421.
5. Id.
6. See generally Comment, Denaturalizationof Nazi War Criminals: Is There Sufficient
Justice For Those Who Would Not DispenseJustice?, 40 MD. L. REV. 39, 72-73 (1981).
21 CORNELL IN'L L.J. 287 (1988)
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One such individual was recently executed. 7 Another defendant, acquitted of war crimes by the district court, may nevertheless be deported by
the INS to the Soviet Union. 8
The deportation of innocent persons is possible for two reasons.
First, the United States does not assert jurisdiction over persons who
committed war crimes. Second, although denaturalization is a proceeding in equity, judges may not exercise their equity power to consider
innocence, good citizenship, or a probable ultimate death sentence. 9
During the trial, a judge may consider only whether the defendant was
originally eligible for citizenship or for his entry visa. Any immigration
irregularity is sufficient to strip the defendant of citizenship and subject
him to deportation, probably to the Soviet Union. 10 If stripped of citizenship, the defendant's only hope for escaping this "juggernaut" lies in
the ability of a political office-the U.S. Attorney General's-to step in
and block deportation.1 This Note contends that such a "remedy" is
grossly inadequate.
Part I of this Note examines the historical anomalies that permitted
war criminals to enter the United States, the legal regimes that governed
their entry, and the creation of the organization now prosecuting them.
Part II describes the due process deficiencies of denaturalization procedure in general, as well as some known deficiencies unique to OSI prosecutions. Part III analyzes the Nazi prosecutions from a different angle,
focusing upon the problems inherent in avoiding a trial on the merits
and the serious injustice that can thereby result. Parts IV and V assess
the inadequacies of the remedies heretofore suggested, make two alternative proposals for reform, and weigh the relative merits of each
proposal.
7. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597 F.2d
946 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'gdenied, 601 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. En banc 1979), aft'd, 449 U.S.
490 (1981). Fedorenko was executed in July, 1987. See infra note 185.
8. United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'k 571 F. Supp. 1104
(D.N.J. 1983). Kungys emigrated from Lithuania. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. at 1136.
Under current procedures, he will likely be sent back to his country of origin (now
the U.S.S.R.), except in the unlikely event he can find another country willing to take
him.
At least one other defendant may be following the same path, Serge Kowalchuk.
United States V. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1188 (1986), aft'g, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Pa. 1983). TheJustice Department said
that Kowalchuk, a Ukrainian, could be deported to the Soviet Union. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 1, 1986, § I, at 13, col. 4; see also infra note 130.
9. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 513-16.
10. More than three-quarters of the defendants currently being prosecuted face
probable deportation to the Soviet Union or other Eastern European countries. See
infra note 136.
11. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
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I. Denaturalization Law
A.

Relevant Definitions

Denaturalization and expatriation are terms concerning the loss of citizenship. Denaturalization is an involuntary proceeding whereby the
U.S. government revokes citizenship. 12 Denaturalization creates the
legal fiction that the denaturalized person never was a U.S. citizen. 13
Expatriation, in contrast, is the voluntary surrender or abandonment of
nationality or allegiance. Loss of citizenship through expatriation
14
occurs automatically upon an expatriating act by the citizen.
Extradition and deportation are legal processes by which a country
removes individuals involuntarily. In extradition, one state formally
requests another state to detain and surrender an individual whom the
requesting state seeks to prosecute.' 5 The United States refuses to
extradite unless it has a formal extradition treaty with the requesting
state.16 Deportation is a unilateral action whereby the United States
expels an alien from this country.' 7 Technically, a deported alien is not
"sent" anywhere since the U.S. interest in the matter ends upon the
alien's expulsion.' 8 Most alleged Nazi war criminals face deportation,
not extradition,' 9 because the United States does not have an extradition treaty with the Soviet Union, the country of origin of most of these
defendants. 20 Citizenship is the necessary link between denaturalization
21
(or expatriation) and deportation. Only aliens may be deported.
Thus, the necessary precondition to deportation is either denaturalization or an expatriating act.
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982). "[The denaturalization proceeding is regarded as
a direct, and not a collateral, attack upon the naturalization judgment ....
It is
important to bear in mind, moreover, that asserted fraud or impropriety . . . [in
obtaining naturalization] does not make the [naturalization] decree void but only
voidable." 3 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 20.2(a) (1959) (emphasis added) [hereinafter GORDON & ROSENFIELD]. See infra
notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
13. 8 U.S.C. § 145 1(a) (1982). Because denaturalization merely changes the status of a U.S. citizen to that of resident alien, the government must then seek a deportation hearing before it can expel the denaturalized person. Comment, supra note 6,

at 46.
14. 3

GORDON

15. See M.C.

& ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 20.7(a).

BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

2 (1974).

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 7.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1254 (1982).
8 C.F.R. 242.17(c). IA GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 5.8(f).
John Demjanjuk is a famous exception. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1986, § 1, at 10,

col. 1. For an account of the Demjanjuk proceedings, see Reiss, The ExtraditionofJohn

Demjanjuk: War Crimes, Universality, and the Political Offense Doctrine, 20 CORNELL INT'L
LJ. 281 (1987).
20. See infra notes 136 and 140.
21. Citizens may, of course, be extradited. See generally IA GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, §§ 4.5(a), (b) and (d).
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Although Congress passed the first act governing denaturalization in
1906,22 the courts have been the true shapers of the law. Injohannessen
v. United States, 23 the Supreme Court declared denaturalization to be a
proceeding in equity. The Johannessen court reasoned that the antecedent naturalization is a possessory interest "closely analogous to a public grant of land," and therefore must be "open like other public grants
to be revoked if and when it shall be found to have been unlawfully or
fraudulently procured."' 24 Because rules of civil rather than criminal
procedure apply to equitable proceedings, theJohannessendecision led to
significant due process problems. 25 For example, the Court denied a
defendant's request for a jury trial the succeeding year, 26 and only
required the prosecution to prove guilt by a preponderance of the evi27
dence, the least rigorous evidentiary standard.
The Court soon recognized that Johannessen's "land" analogy was
"flawed and ill-conceived," 2 8 abandoning it in 1943 in Schneiderman v.
United States,29 conceding that the loss of one's citizenship "is more serious than a taking of one's property, or the imposition of a fine or other
penalty;"'30 the Court elevated the prosecution's burden of proof to evidence that must be clear and convincing. 3 ' Although individual justices
subsequently characterized citizenship in even stronger terms, as a right
as precious as life or liberty,3

2

the Court has not further elevated the

level of due process protection. The Court has applied the Schneidermnan
33
standard in every subsequent denaturalization proceeding.
22. The original statute was the Act ofJune 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 15, 34 Stat. 601.
The current law is the Immigration and Nationality Act ofJune 27, 1952, Pub. L. No.
414, § 340, 66 Stat. 260 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982)). Section
340 of the Act is the sole method of denaturalization. United States v. Zucca, 351
U.S. 91, 99 (1956) (quoting Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 83-84 (1951)).
23. 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
24. Id. at 238.
25. See infra notes 109-35 and accompanying text. See generally Comment, supra
note 6.
26. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Zgrebec, 38 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Mich. 1941)
(cited in Comment, supra note 6, at 62).
28. Comment, supra note 6, at 65.
29. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
30. Id. at 122.
31. Id. at 123. For discussion of this advance, see Comment, supra note 6, at 6162. See also United States v. Zgrebec, 38 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
32. Justice Brandeis described denaturalization as a loss of "all that makes life
worth living." Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Justice Rutledge said
that "[t]o take away a man's citizenship deprives him of a right no less precious than
life or liberty, indeed of one which today comprehends those rights and almost all
others." Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616 (1949) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring).
33. 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 20.5d(3). See also infra text accompanying note 50.
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2. Groundsfor Denaturalization
An applicant for a visa, residency, or naturalization must fully disclose
all material facts; misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact
constitutes illegal procurement of citizenship and is grounds for denaturalization.3 4 The Court set forth the requisite standard of materiality in
Chaunt v. United States.3 5 Under Chaunt, concealment of a fact that would
have been grounds for denial of status, or concealment of a fact that
might have led to the discovery of facts that would have been grounds for
36
denial, constitute grounds for revocation of citizenship.
For example, the concealment or misrepresentation of participation
in subversive associations and activities, such as Nazi and Communist
Party affiliations,3 7 is grounds for denaturalization.3 8 The existence of a
criminal record usually bars residency or naturalization, and is always
relevant to eligibility.3 9 Knowingly making false statements about marital or family status, past residence, or occupations or trade, that conceal
information that would have led to denial of the naturalization petition,
is also a ground for denaturalization. 40 Indeed, any deliberate misrepresentation or concealment, even if not material, might be grounds for
denaturalization, as tending to show the applicant's lack of good moral
41
character.
Most of these grounds have provided the basis for denaturalization
suits against alleged Nazi war criminals. 4 2 For example, conviction of
34. 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, §§ 20.4a, 20.4b(2).
35. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).

36. Id. (emphasis added). In Chaunt, the defendant had been arrested three times
for distributing handbills in a public street, making an oration in a public park, and
generally disturbing the peace. Id. at 352. Eleven years later, when the defendant
filled out a form in connection with his petition for naturalization, he answered "no"
to whether he had ever been arrested or charged with any violation of U.S. law. Id. at
351-52. The prosecution argued that if the defendant had told the truth about his
arrests, the subsequent investigation might have revealed that the defendant had
been a leader in the Communist Party and thus ineligible for citizenship. Id. at 352.
The Court held, however, that,
in the circumstances of this case, the Government has failed to show by 'clear,

unequivocal, and convincing' evidence either (1) that facts were suppressed
which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their

disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the
discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship.
Id. at 355.
37. See Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958) (Communist Party); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949) (Nazi Party); Sweet v. United States, 211
F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954) (Communist Party).
38. 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 20.4b(4)(b).

39. Id. § 20.4b(4)(a).
40. Id. §§ 20.4b(4)(c)-().
41. Id. § 20.4b(4)(d); see also id § 15.15.
42. In United States v. Linnas, 527 F.Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 685 F.2d
427 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982), the defendant was charged with

illegal procurement, concealment of material facts, willful misrepresentation, having
committed crimes of moral turpitude, and lacking the requisite good moral character.
In United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.

1012 (1986), the defendant was charged with having "illegally procured" his natural-
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war crimes or of crimes against humanity would, ipsofacto, show that the
defendant lacked the requisite good character ever to have gained citizenship. 43 Furthermore, membership in any Nazi-affiliated party in any
German-occupied country, or in an analogous group such as the Nazidominated police forces in German-occupied Ukraine and the Baltic
republics, would have constituted grounds for exclusion under the
II and thus would constiimmigration regimes set up after World War
44
tute grounds for current denaturalization.
The Chaunt test applies expansively to defendants alleged to be Nazi
war criminals. The government need not prove that the defendant was a
member of the Nazi party or a guard in a concentration camp. Once the
government shows that the defendant misstated his occupation or residence during the War, it need prove only that an accurate statement
about occupation or residence would have led to an investigation that
might have uncovered evidence of incriminating activities. 4 5
3.

The DenaturalizationProcess

United States Attorneys institute denaturalization proceedings in their
respective districts upon the order of the Department ofJustice. 4 6 Typically the government brings suit in the United States District Court for
the district in which the defendant resides or last resided. 4 7 Because the
suit is in equity, it is tried without a jury unless specifically ordered by
the court. 48 Unless the defendant pleads the privilege against self
incrimination, the court may compel the defendant to testify. If the
defendant invokes the privilege, his silence may be the basis for adverse
comment and inference. 4 9 The government must present evidence that
ization, or having procured it by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. In United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107

S.Ct. 431 (Nov. 10, 1986), the defendant is charged with illegal procurement, misrepresentation, and lack of the requisite good moral character.
43. Crimes of moral turpitude constitute one ground of exclusion. 1 GORDON &
ROSENFIELD, supra

note 12, § 2.43 (citing Sec. 212(a)(9), Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(9)). A new ground of exclusion was added in 1978, specifically barring the
entry of any alien who, between March 29, 1933, and May 8, 1945, participated in any
Nazi-associated persecutions. Id. § 2.47a.
44. See supra note 37, and infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. Similarly,
service as a guard in a concentration camp, whether voluntary or involuntary, would
have constituted a bar to entry. United States v. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
The trial court found Fedorenko innocent of the atrocities of which he was accused.
Yet, his status as a guard at Treblinka was sufficient to mandate denaturalization and
deportation. "The plain language of the [Displaced Persons] Act mandates precisely
the literal interpretation that the District Court rejected: an individual's service as a
concentration camp guard-whether voluntary or involuntary-made him ineligible
for a visa." Id. at 512.
45. See supra note 36.
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982); see also 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12,
§ 20.5c(1).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982); see also 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12,
§ 20.5c(2).
48. 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 20.5d(2); see FED. R. CIv. P. 38(1).
49. 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 20.5d(2). Silence has not, how-

ever, been dispositive of guilt in any case to date. Id.

1988

293

Nazi War Criminal Deportation

is clear, unequivocal, and convincing, a standard easier to satisfy than
the reasonable doubt standard used in criminal prosecutions. 50 A
defendant may appeal an adverse decision to a United States Court of
Appeals and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court. The appellate court
reviews the evidence de novo. 5 1
C.

Deportation

A single immigration officer, the immigration judge, conducts deportation hearings. 52 His decision may be appealed to the Board of Immigra53
tion Appeals (BIA), whose decision to hear the appeal is discretionary.
During the hearing, the defendant may designate countries to which he
wants to be deported; these countries, however, may refuse to accept
him, in which case he may be deported to the place of his nationality or
54
former residence or to any country that will accept him.
A denaturalized person is not only considered an alien, but in a
legal fiction courts have held him never to have been a citizen through
the principle of "relation-back." ' 55 However, although an alien, he is not
necessarily subject to deportation.5 6 In most cases the Attorney General can prevent deportation. 5 7 However, a recent amendment to the
law removes the Attorney General's discretionary powers in cases of
aliens who assisted in Nazi persecutions. 58
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. § 20.5d(3).
Id. § 20.5d(5).
IA GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 5.7a.
Id. § 5.13a.

54. See id. §§ 5.17(a)-(c) (citing Sec. 243(a), Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)).
55. Id. § 20.6. The denaturalized citizen is restored to his previous state of alienage. "The purpose of this concept is to deprive the wrongdoer of benefits accruing
from his wrongful actions. While this purpose doubtless is sound, a legal fiction cannot completely obliterate actualities which have developed while the naturalized per-

son possessed a paper title to citizenship." 3

GORDON

& ROSENFIELD, supra note 12,

§ 20.6. The legal fiction of never having been a citizen can have tragic consequences.
In many situations, the defendant's spouse and children will also lose citizenship, a
situation carrying overtones of tainted blood. Id. The 1952 Act provided a complicated formula governing derivative citizenship as follows:
(a) all derivative citizenship rights are extinguished if the denaturalization
was based on actual concealment or misrepresentation;
(b) derivative citizenship rights are extinguished if the denaturalization was
based on presumptive fraud unless the derivative is residing in the
United States at the time of the denaturalization decree;
(c) derivative citizenship rights are not affected if the denaturalization was
based on illegality.
Id. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 340(0, 66 Stat. 260
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982)).
Thus, a child born in this country has a claim on citizenship, but one brought over
as an infant, now knowing no language other than English, could therefore be
deported as an adult.
56. Id.
57. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 243(h), 66 Stat.
214; see also IA GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 5.16(b)(1).
58. See Act of Oct. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, § 104, 92 Stat. 2065. The Board
of Immigration Appeals has adopted a broad reading of "assisted," using an objec-
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The Relevant Immigration Law

1. Historical Background
The situation in Europe after World War II created two aspects of the
problem this Note addresses: the influx into the United States of war
criminals; and the influx of non-war criminals who nevertheless needed
to conceal aspects of their war-time background in order to qualify for
entry. When hostilities ended, the Allies were confronted by millions of
displaced persons. 59 These included war refugees, prisoners of war,
survivors of concentration and extermination camps, and 1.5 million
non-German laborers conscripted by the Germans to operate German
farms and industry. 60 Large numbers of displaced persons whose coun61
try of origin was now occupied by Soviet forces refused to go back.
Expulsions of ethnic minorities from many countries,6 2 as well as refugees from the newly-Communist countries in Eastern Europe,6 3 exacerbated the problem in the immediate post-war years.
As the plight of displaced persons worsened over the next several
years, international dissatisfaction grew concerning the United States's
restrictive and ethnically biased immigration laws. 64 The United States
Congress responded by enacting the Displaced Persons Act of 1948
(hereinafter DPA). 6 5 Under the aegis of the DPA, 440,000 displaced
persons immigrated to the United States. 6 6 Some of these immigrants
were Nazi war criminals who slipped in by misrepresenting their backgrounds. 67 Significantly, many persons who were not war criminals also
tive test, not a test based upon intent to assist or upon direct participation in persecution. See infra note 191; see also IA GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 5.16b(1).
59. The Allies found approximately 2.5 million displaced persons in Germany
alone. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1945, at 4, col. 4.
60. See generally Refugees, 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 9 (15th ed. 1987).
61. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1946, at 9, col. 8 (Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian
DPs estimated at 250,000); N.Y. Times, June 21, 1946, at 4, col. 7 (UNRRA (United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) poll of DPs in Germany reported
to show only 6% want repatriation); N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1945, at 8, col. 2 (about
one million Poles, Yugoslavs, former Baltic States citizens, and pre-1939 Russians
oppose repatriation); N.Y. Times, May 24, 1945, at 7, col. 4.
62. One week of reports in the New York Times illustrates the continuing dislocations. See N.Y. Times, June 5, 1946, at 5, col. 1 (U.S. Zone of Germany unable to
handle scheduled influx of 2,377,000 deportees); id. at 6, col. 6 (Polish government
announces expulsion of 500,000 Germans since March 1); id. (repatriation of 800,000
Poles from U.S.S.R. territory to be completed by end ofJuly); id. at 11, col. 8 (Czechoslovakia to transfer 65,000 German civilians to U.S.S.R. Zone of Germany by
November).
63. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 was created solely to meet this continuing
problem. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1946, at 6, col. 5 (Pope assails forcible repatriation moves, urges lifting of U.S. immigration restrictions as aid in solving problem).
For a description of the ethnic bias of contemporary U.S. immigration laws, see infra
note 81.
65. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended
by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (expired 1952).
66. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
67. Most Nazi war criminals entered the United States under the DPA. See infra
note 84 and accompanying text.
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misrepresented themselves in order to qualify under the DPA.6 8
Many displaced persons misrepresented themselves simply because
the United States was an attractive option when compared to war-ravished Europe.6 9 Evidence suggests that fears of forced repatriation
motivated others.70 The Allies forcibly repatriated over two million persons during and immediately after the War, and several thousand more
in 1946 and 1947.71 Forced repatriation remained a fear, with charges
72
of continued forced repatriations occasionally appearing in the press.
Newspapers played up stories of numerous suicides and savage violence
employed by troops at the entrainments. 73 The Eastern bloc countries
considered refugees from their countries to be collaborators and war
criminals, 74 and pressed aggressively for forced repatriation of all
nationals, which Great Britain and the United States opposed. 75
68. According to one historian, between a quarter and half a million Soviet nonRussians managed to evade repatriation, often by forging DP papers showing
another nationality. Only 35,000 such Soviet citizens were listed officially as having
been retained knowingly in the West. N. TOLSTOY, THE SECRET BETRAYAL 371-72

(1977). Of those who were retained unknowingly, any estimate would place a significant percentage in the United States which, along with Canada, Australia, and the
United Kingdom, took large numbers of DPs.
69. Those who misrepresented themselves to enter the United States but who
were not genuine war criminals could fall into varying degrees of culpability: Soviet
citizens of the minority peoples (e.g., Ukrainians, Byelorussians, etc.) who evaded
possible forced repatriation by forging DP papers giving them another nationality,
people who billeted Nazi troops in their homes, managers of factories, officials in
villages and towns, members of local militia dominated by the Nazis, guards in concentration or extermination camps. Reasonable persons can differ about the level of
moral culpability, for instance, of a prisoner of war conscripted into serving as a
camp guard. Many were vicious sadists, while some may have been victims of the
Nazis. The U.S. denaturalization and deportation process makes no attempt to calibrate moral distinctions. Savage war criminals, people who misstated their age or
birthplace, and all the degrees of moral culpability between, are treated similarly: all
are equally prosecuted, denaturalized, and deported, regardless of what awaits them
following deportation.
70. See N.Y. Times, May 25, 1946, at 8, col. 4 (describing Ukrainians' terror at
possibility of repatriation to U.S.S.R.).
71. N. TOLSTOY, supra note 68, at 371-72. Tolstoy puts the figure at 2,272,000
between 1943 and 1947. From September, 1945 to January, 1946 a moratorium
existed on forced repatriations. Between January, 1946 and May, 1947, a few thousand more were compelled to return. Id.
72. The New York Times reported a virtual manhunt conducted by U.S.S.R.
agents within France. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1946, at 7, col. 2. It also printed charges
by Cardinal Tisserant who reported forcible shipments of Ruthenians, Ukrainians,
Slovenes, Slovaks, and other groups in Germany and Austria to the U.S.S.R. by the
United States and Great Britain despite assertions to the contrary by the United
States State Department. Tisserant charged that the Crimea Conference accords
provided for return of persons who left the U.S.S.R. after 1929 and cited the kidnapping of refugees from camps near Rome. N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1946, at 3, col. 5.
73. N. TOLSTOY, supra note 68, at 370. At least one attempted suicide actually
occurred, when a returning prisoner tried to slit his own throat. Id.
74. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1946, at 6, col. 2 (Ukrainian Soviet Republic charges
most DPs not wanting to return home are war criminals and collaborators).
75. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1947, at 4, col. 8 (Ukraine official urges forcible repatriation); id., Aug. 16, 1946, at 12, col. 5 (UNRRA council debates treatment of displaced persons; Eastern bloc seeks total repatriation; Westerners refuse to force
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Indeed, the displaced persons camps were such hotbeds of anti-Soviet
when the Allies
feeling that one camp rioted from fear of repatriation
76
merely tried to move it to another location.
2.

The Evolution of United States Immigration Law

The United States joined fifteen countries in adopting the Constitution
of the International Refugee Organization (IRO). 77 The Constitution,
which became effective in August of 1948,78 set international standards
for treatment of refugees and displaced persons. 7 9 Congress subsequently enacted the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA) to implement
the IRO Constitution.8 0 The DPA temporarily suspended the annual
quotas of immigrants from various countries to facilitate immigration
8
into the United States by persons eligible under the IRO Constitution. '
In the three and one-half years following passage of the DPA, 440,000
repatriation); id., Mar. 18, 1946, at 10, col. 4 (Polish delegate to UNRRA Subcommittee on Displaced Persons urges forced repatriation); id., Feb. 9, 1946, § 1, at 2, col. 3
(Mrs. Roosevelt leads UNO fight to reject U.S.S.R. efforts to allow East European
countries to enforce repatriation).
76. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1947, at 24, col. 4; id., Feb. 2, 1946, at 6, col. 2
(Ukrainians feared forced repatriation after twenty-five Ukrainians arrested for
assaulting Russian officials in Ukrainian camp).
77. Aug. 20, 1948, 62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846, 18 U.N.T.S. 4.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended
by Act ofJune 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (expired 1952).
81. Visas were to be issued to 202,000 eligible displaced persons in the next two
years; an amendment then increased the number to 341,000 for three years, beginning in 1948. Id. Ultimately, 440,000 entered. See infra note 82.
The need for such an act was apparent from the sheer numbers of displaced persons and the existence of national origin quotas in U.S. immigration law. For example, approximately 250,000 Baltic displaced persons were reported in 1946. See supra
note 62. As shown in the table below, however, the annual quotas for the three Baltic
countries totaled only 738 persons annually. At the same time, 60,000 Lithuanians
alone were reported in displaced persons camps. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1947, at 20,
col. 6. This system of country-by-country quotas had been set up by the Immigration
Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5, and revised but not scrapped by the
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, formerly the McCarran-Walter Act. The law based each country's annual quota upon
ratios of persons of each national origin actually in the United States in 1920, with
some exceptions-Japanese and Chinese were totally excluded. M. BENNETr, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A HISTORY 173 (1963). The purpose of the quota system was to prevent the ethnic and cultural composition of the United States from
changing. The motives were xenophobic and racist. As Senator McCarran wrote in
]
defense of the quota system, and of his own revised immigration law: "[T oday there
are hard-core, indigestible blocs which have not become integrated into the American way of life .... This oasis of the world [the U.S.] shall be overrun, perverted,
contaminated, or destroyed .. " Id. (emphasis added). The quotas varied widely.
Great Britain and Northern Ireland were allowed 65,721 spaces, while many countries received only 100 spaces (the minimum). The following table shows annual
quota spaces under the two immigration acts for the countries of origin of alleged
Nazi war criminals, and the number from those countries admitted under the special
emergency provisions described in this section.
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refugees entered the United States. 8 2 To further assist refugees fleeing
Communist-controlled Europe, Congress in 1953 passed the Refugee
Relief Act, which increased the number of individuals allowed to immigrate. 83 Nearly all the alleged Nazi war criminals under current investigation and prosecution entered the United States under one of these
84
emergency protocols.
All these acts contained provisions excluding war criminals from
entry. The IRO Constitution specifically excluded from eligibility for
resettlement war criminals, quislings, traitors, and individuals who
assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries. 8 5 Initially, the DPA excluded from entry "any person who is or has been a
member of, or participated in, any movement which is or has been hostile to the United States or the form of government of the United
States."' 86 The amended version of the DPA excluded "... any person
who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of
race, religion, or national origin or... any person who has voluntarily
borne arms against the United States during World War II. '' 8 7 The Refugee Relief Act differed only slightly from the amended DPA.8 8 This
Country

1924

1952

(annual quota)

No. Admitted

(annual quota)

Estonia

116

115

DPA and Refugee
Relief Act
11,247

Latvia
Lithuania

236
386

235
384

6,524
2,798
938

38,207
27,263

6,488
2,697
933

Poland
U.S.S.R.
Yugoslavia

159,952
43,749
57,664
49-51 (1955); M. BENNETT,

F. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
supra, at 338. The DPA, unfortunately, mortgaged up to half of future quotas to
accomplish the purposes of immediate entries, so that countries with small quotas
lost even half that far into the future. Id. at 76-77. Latvia's quota, for example, was
mortgaged until the year 2123. F. AUERBACH, supra, at 81. A 1965 revision abolished
the national origin quotas altogether. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79

Stat. 911 (effectiveJune 30, 1968); see 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 1.4a.

82. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 1.2d.
83. Act of Aug. 7, 1953, Pub. L. No. 82-203, 67 Stat. 400, amended by Act of Aug.

31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 751, 68 Stat. 1044.

84. Indeed, virtually all alleged Nazi war criminals entered the United States
under the Displaced Persons Act. Lippman, The Denaturalizationof Nazi War Criminals
in the United States: Is Justice Being Served?, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169, 179 (1985). The
President has the power to regulate aliens' departure from and entry into the United
States during wartime. Act of May 22, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-154, 40 Stat. 559. See
generally Lippman, supra, at 178-80.
85. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, supra note 77 at
Annex, Part II(1), (2). See also Lippman, supra note 84, at 179.
86. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 774, § 13, 62 Stat. 1009. See also
Lippman, supra note 84, at 179.

87. An Act to Amend the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 81-555,

§ 11, 64 Stat. 219 (1950). The word "personally" was added to modify "advocated

and assisted in the persecution."
88. Refugee Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 83-203, § 14(a), 67 Stat. 400, 406 (1953); see
Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and
InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
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Act did not exclude applicants on the basis of mere membership in the
Nazi party.8 9
In 1952, Congress established the structure of contemporary
United States immigration law by passing the Immigration and Nationality Act.9 0 Of the categories of aliens deportable under the Act, the following four have been used to prosecute alleged Nazi war criminals: (1)
individuals who procured a visa or entered the United States by fraud,
or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact;9 1 (2) individuals who
committed a crime of moral turpitude before entering the United States
or who have admitted committing such a crime; 9 2 (3) individuals with
past or current membership in, or affiliation with, a totalitarian party, its
affiliates or predecessor or successor organizations;9 3 and (4) individuals who were excludable on their entry into the United States under
existing laws such as the Displaced Persons Act or the Refugee Relief
Act.9 4 The Act of October 30, 1978, amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act to specifically exclude Nazi war criminals and to author95
ize the deportation of those now in the United States.
E.

The Office of Special Investigations

The Attorney General created the Office of Special Investigations (OSI)
after the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) failed to vigorously prosecute Nazi war criminals. A General Accounting Office study
had concluded that INS investigation of some cases before 1973 was
either deficient or perfunctory.9 6 Although a Special Investigations Unit
existed within the INS to denaturalize and deport Nazi war criminals, its
funding was withheld by the INS. 9 7 Facing "Congressional displeasure," the Attorney General, by executive order, transferred the unit to
the Justice Department, Where it became the OSI. 98
OSI's vigor presents a sharp contrast to that of the INS. In the
thirty years preceding the OSI's establishment, the INS prosecuted only
one war criminal, Andrija Artukovic, which single effort that proved
unsuccessful.9 9 In contrast, by August 15, 1984, OSI had 300 individu89. Lippman, supra note 84, at 180 n.64.
90. Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
Stat. 163; see 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, at §§ 1.3, 1.4.
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(A)(19) (1982).
92. Id. § 1182(A)(9).

93. Id. § 1182(A)(28)(c).

94. Id. § 1251(A)(1).
95. Act of Oct. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (codified at 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1182(A)(33), 1251(9), 1253(N), 1254(c) (1982)).
96. See Lippman, supra note 84, at 177 n.45 (citing GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, WIDESPREAD CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT PROBES OF ALLEGED NAZI WAR
CRIMINALS NOT SUPPORTED By AVAILABLE EVIDENCE-CONTROVERSY MAY CONTINUE,

Report No. GA 1.13 GGD-78-73, at 8-39 (1978)).
97. Lippman, supra note 84, at 177.
98. Id. at 177-78. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 54,045 (1979), codifiedas 28 C.F.R. § 0.55.
99. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 206 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and
remanded on othergrounds, 355 U.S. 393 (1958) On remand, United States v. Artukovic,
170 F.Supp. 383, 393 (S.D. Cal. 1959), the district court refused to surrender the
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als under investigation and 35 cases in litigation.' 0 0 Of these, many
defendants have been denaturalized,10 and several deported, 10 2 including Artukovic, who was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death
in Yugoslavia. 10 3 One person, Frank Walus, successfully appealed his
conviction on the basis of new, exonerating evidence,1 0 4 and one denaturalization suit has been denied.' 0 5
II. General Problems With Process
Several journal articles have identified deficiencies in the Nazi war
crimes trials, including problems of estoppel, 10 6 relaxed due process in
defendant to Yugoslavia because the alleged war crime constituted a non extraditable
"political offense". See also In re Artukovic, No. A7-095-961 (Bd. Imm. App., filed
Mar. 7, 1980) (government overturned the 1959 stay of deportation pursuant to the
Act of Oct. 30, 1978). For a discussion of the relevant issues involved in these proceedings, see Comment, supra note 6, at 42-43 n.10, 50-51 n.38.
100. Taylor, Jr., Deported Bishop Flies to Portugal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1984, at 3,
col. 2.
101. Twenty-five have been denaturalized already; three others have voluntarily
left the country before formal legal proceedings began (Arthur Rudolph, Paul
Bluemel, Juozas Kisielatis). See supra note 4.
102. Those deported include Fedorenko, see N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, § I, at A3,
col. 5; Bohdan Koziy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1985, § II, at B5, col. 5; Alexander Lehman, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1984, § I, at A19, col. 1; Archbishop Valerian D. Trifa, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 15, 1984, § I, at A3, col. 1; HansJ. Lipschis, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1983,
§ I, at A8, col. 1; Karl Linnas, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1987, § I, at Al, col. 6.
103. See N.Y. Times, July 26, 1986, § I, at A2, col. 6 (Croatia Supreme Court
rejects Artukovic's appeal of death sentence); Kaufman, Croatian War Criminal Sentenced to FiringSquad, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1986, § I, at A2, col. 3; id., Apr. 19, 1986,
§ I, at A2, col. 6 (Artukovic lapses into disorientation at war crimes trial); id., Feb. 16,
1986, § I, at 17, col. 1 (Artukovic formally charged with ordering murder of
231,000); Pear, U.S. Extradites Croat to Yugoslavia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1986, § I, at
A3, col. 1.
104. United States v. Walus, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980); see infra notes 117-29
and accompanying text.
105. United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985) (denaturalization suit
denied), aff'g, No. CV-82-1804 (E.D. N.Y. May 18, 1984).
106. See Comment, The Effect of Government Knowledge on DenaturalizationProceedings:
A Return to Illegal Procurement?, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 519 (1981). Many alleged war
criminals have argued that the government is precluded from bringing suit either
because it had, or should have had, sufficient knowledge at the time of the naturalization of the facts now alleged in the denaturalization suit. The estoppel argument is
especially significant because reliance by the government is an essential element in
proving misrepresentation, a key charge in many of the war crimes denaturalization
suits. Id. at 520 & n.8. Allegations have also been made that government departments colluded with war criminals to evade restrictions in the DPA, so as to obtain
the collaboration of people whose scientific expertise was useful to the national
defense or who were able to give intelligence information about the Soviet Union.
These allegations were substantiated recently. See Blumenthal, C.IA. Accused of Aid to
30's Terrorist, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1986, § II, at 5, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 29, 1985,
§ I, at 7, col. 1. The GAO told Congress that at least two wanted Nazi war criminals,
as well as an SS officer and a convicted assassin, received official U.S. help in immigrating to the United States after World War II; all four reportedly had links to U.S.
intelligence agencies. According to the GAO, the CIA misled Congress when it
denied such reports several years earlier during hearings. See Comptroller General
of the United States, Widespread Conspiracy to Obstruct Probes of Alleged Nazi War
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denaturalization proceedings,' 0 7 and the use of Soviet source evidence.' 0 8 This section briefly describes these specific problems.
A.

Due Process Concerns

In Klapprott v. United States, Justice Rutledge persuasively stated the case
for a strict application of due process in all denaturalization cases:
To take away a man's citizenship deprives him of a right no less precious than life or liberty, indeed of one which today comprehends those
rights and almost all others. To lay upon the citizen the punishment of
exile for committing murder, or even treason, is a penalty thus far
unknown to our law and at most but doubtfully within Congress' power.
U.S. Const., Amend. VIII. Yet by the device or label of a civil suit, carried
forward with none of the safeguards of criminal procedure provided by
the Bill of Rights, this most comprehensive and basic right of all, so it has
been held, can be taken away and in its wake may follow the most cruel
penalty of banishment. ... Regardless of the name given it, the denaturalization proceeding when it is successful has all the consequences and

effects of a penal or criminal conviction, except that the ensuing liability
10 9
to deportation is a greater penalty than is generally inflicted for crime.
The due process deficiencies inherent in the U.S. denaturalization
proceedings are numerous. There is no statute of limitations in denaturalization cases.11° The defendant's failure to testify is subject to
adverse comment. I " The defendant has no right to trial by jury 1 2 or
state-provided counsel if indigent. 133 Furthermore, the defendant may
be "convicted" by a standard of guilt less than "beyond a reasonable
doubt." 1 4 These due process deficiencies are not only longstanding,11 5 but are especially unfair in light of the high stakes for accused
6
war criminals." 1
Criminals Not Supported by Available Evidence-controversy May Continue, No.
GGP-78-73, iii (May 15, 1978); for a summary of this report, see Comment, supra at
520 n.10.
107. See infra notes 109-35 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
109. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616-17, 619 (1949) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted).
110. 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, at § 20.2e.
111. Id. § 20.5d(2); see supra note 49.

112. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. The court can, however, order a
jury trial. Id.
113. See Comment, supra note 6, at 88; Lippmann, supra note 84, at 203.
114. See supra notes 50, 58 and accompanying text.
115. See Comment, supra note 6, at 70, 72-73.
116. Loss of citizenship is always a severe penalty. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. For the alleged Nazi war criminals, however, denaturalization results in
devastating public opprobrium, and vulnerability to war crimes trials abroad as long
as they live. See Comment, supra note 6, at 73-74 & n.147. This vulnerability is especially strong when defendants face probable deportation to countries when a strong
state interest may influence the outcome of a trial, or, as was the case with one
defendant, where a trial has already been held in absentia and a death sentence proclaimed. See In re Linnas, No. A8-085-626 (Bd. Imm. App., Oct. 16, 1985) (cited as
Interim Decision #300 in Hein's Interim Decisions Service, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
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The prosecution of Frank Walus shows how the denial of a right to
a jury and of the right to state-provided counsel can create injustice in
the war crimes context. 117 Walus was accused of committing crimes
against civilians in the ghettos of Kielce and Czestochowa, Poland, while
allegedly a member of the Gestapo, or "SS".

118

He pleaded an alibi-

that he was removed from his home in Poland at age seventeen, spending the years in question as a forced laborer on German farms. 19
Walus's evidence consisted of documentary records from the German
bureaucracy,' 20 and affidavits from witnesses such as fellow forced
laborers, the farm owners who employed him, and a priest whose church
he attended. 12 1 Despite this evidence, the district court judge found
Walus guilty.' 2 2 Although Walus subsequently produced additional evi3
dence strengthening his alibi, the judge refused to re-open the case.12
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction
and remanded for a new trial.' 24 The Court of Appeals commented several times on the extraordinary bias shown by the district court judge.12 5
1983) (evidence presented that results of trial and death sentence published before
the trial took place).
117. United States v. Walus, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980), rev' 453 F. Supp. 699
(N.D. Ill. 1978).
118. Walus, 453 F. Supp at 700.
119. Id. at 704-05.
120. These included records from the German health insurance system, as well as
other documents. Id. at 708.
121. Id. at 706-07. The judge found the alibi testimony to be inconsistent and of
limited credibility. Id.
122. Id. at 716.
123. Walus made two motions to vacate based on newly discovered evidence, both
documentary and testimonial, from a laborer from Poland, a prisoner of war from
France, and a priest who claimed to have known him from 1942-45. He also submitted statements from a German institute asserting that Poles were not admitted in the
Gestapo or the SS, and that Walus did not meet the height requirements. The district court judge denied the motions but was overturned on appeal. United States v.
Walus, 616 F.2d 283, 285-86 (7th Cir. 1980).
124. Id. at 304.
125. The court stated that "our reading of the record has revealed instances of
attitudes we find somewhat disturbing on the part of this experienced trial judge,"
but declined to require reversal on this ground. Id. at 286-87. For example:
The record shows that the district court often restricted questioning on the
subject of the perpetrator's resemblance to the defendant or expressly
accorded no significance to the answers given. During the cross-examination
of the witness Koenigsberg, for example, the defense asked about Koenigsberg's memory of scars or other identifying marks. The trial court interrupted the answer with this exchange with the defendant's counsel:
The Court:
Certainly there is no foundation for asking that kind of
a question. You asked this witness whether he had any
scars on any part of his body. Now, if you were to ask
him if he ever saw him without any clothes on, you
would be laying a foundation.
Defense Attorney:

Your Honor, I specifically askedThe Court:
Let's not waste our time.
Defense Attorney: Judge, I don't want to waste your time.
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Walus prevailed on appeal only because he produced a strongly
The Court:

Defense Attorney:
The Court:
Defense Attorney:
The Court:

He has answered it. You may continue, but I interpose
this observation because I think it is an absurd
question to ask a man whether he ever saw a scar on
any part of his body when he hasn't testified that he
has seen him-had seen him with no clothes on.
Your Honor, I specifically stated on any part of his
body that the witness could see.
Well, you didn't sayI thought I did. If I did not, I apologize to the Court.
I think it is unfair to the witness. I don't know
whether you have any scars on your body or not.
From here, I cannot even see whether you have any on
your face. Continue with the examination. Try to ask
some questions that will help us decide the issues
here.

Id. at 290-91.
Because of the defendant's small stature, the defense also attempted to
show failure of recollection on what could well have been his most distinguishing feature. Questioning on this subject, however, met with a similarly
poor reception from the trial court. During the questioning of the witness
Rozanski, for example, the following exchange occurred:
Defense Attorney: Mr. Rozanski, before you identified the defendant in
the case as the very same man you knew in
Czestochowa, you didn't see him standing up, did you?
Witness:
No.
Defense Attorney: So when you made that identification this morning, the
only view you had of this defendant was from his
stomach upward, isn't that a fact?
Witness:
Yes.
The Court:
Are you suggesting that this witness could see his
stomach?
Defense Attorney: I asked if he could only see the man from his stomach
up. No, I am not suggesting that he could see his
stomach.
The Court:
That is what you said.
Defense Attorney:

I thought it might be interesting in this case, since the
crucial issue is identification, that we explore the area
of identification.
The Court:
How can a man see his stomach, either standing or
sitting? Let's get down to questions that are of
interest here.
... [Material deleted by appellate court]
Defense Attorney: If these questions are not of interest, then I will move
The Court:

How can a man's stomach be seen, either standing or
sitting, without X-ray or some other instrument?
...[Material deleted by appellate court]
Please ask the next question if you have one, sir.
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supported alibi, and was tried by an openly biased judge.12 6 The
judge's biased behavior reflects the incendiary nature of war crimes trials and evidences the need for the right to a jury. Although the conventional wisdom is that defendants prefer ajudge to ajury trial in a highly
emotional case, the Walus case suggests that a defendant may be better
off facing a jury in some such cases. This is particularly true in those
cases where Soviet source evidence plays a crucial role. 12 7 Somejudges
are much less sympathetic than others to defendant complaints about
the nature and trustworthiness of such evidence. In a jury trial, these
biases would likely point in both directions, thus tending to nullify their
effect.
The Walus case also stands as a compelling example of the need for
government supplied counsel. In order to mount a successful defense,
Walus spent one and one-half years engaged in an extensive, costly
search for evidence, covering two continents and stretching 35 years
into the past. 128 In addition, his attorney conducted a three-week investigation in Europe. 129 The Walus case is not unique in this regard; in
general the requirements for an effective defense are daunting. The
events in question occurred forty years ago. Possible witnesses might be
dead, have new names, or be scattered across Europe and North
America. Some witnesses are unavailable because the Soviet government will not allow the defendant to question them.' 3 0 Documentary
evidence is also scattered. Sometimes a defendant requires assistance
from the State Department to obtain access to documents. 13 1 Mounting
a successful defense is made more difficult by the need to counter the
enormous resources of government prosecutors. One judge comId. at 291-92.
126. The district court judge's "disturbing attitude," id., was so pronounced it provoked rebuke on appeal. Walus was fortunate that his judge's bias was sufficiently
overt to be noticed by the court of appeals. A less overtly-biased judge would be less
likely to be reversed.
127. See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.

128.
129.
130.
many

Walus, 616 F.2d at 303.
Id. at 303 n.52.
Defendant Kowalchuk, for example, was denied access to the village in which
people familiar with the events in question still reside. The defendant had

access only to those witnesses produced for deposition by the Soviet government in

its cooperation with the OSI. United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 80 (E.D.
Pa. 1983). The district court judge did not accept the testimony of these Soviet wit-

nesses as clear and convincing evidence of guilt, however, because of the obvious
unfairness in this situation to the defendant. Indeed, the judge was inclined to doubt
the defendant took part in any way in the massacre of the Jewish ghetto at Lubomyl.
Id. at 81. However, by his own testimony the defendant was a member of a Ukrainian
militia, albeit in a largely clerical capacity. This identity meant he was not a genuine
refugee "of concern" to the IRO, and therefore not eligible for the benefits of the
Displaced Persons Act. Id. at 82-83.

131. Frank Walus tried many methods in an attempt to obtain files of district commissions in Kielce or Czestochowa, the Polish towns where the atrocities of which he
was accused had occurred. The defendant requested the district court to issue letters
rogatory to the Polish War Crimes Commission for production of its depositions and
investigative file. Even Secretary of State Vance intervened, but to no avail. Walus,

616 F.2d at 304.
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mented that never before had he seen the government marshal such
resources in prosecuting a case, not even when prosecuting important
1
Mafia and organized crime figures. 32
Many defendants would be unable to afford such efforts. The
defendants are often workingmen or retired people of modest means.
Frank Walus, for instance, was unemployed.' 3 3 Feodor Fedorenko was
a retired foundry worker with a life savings of $5,000.13 4 John
35
Demjanjuk was a retired auto worker.'
B.

The Use of Soviet Source Evidence

Because the OSI largely prosecutes individuals suspected of committing
war crimes in areas now under Soviet control (Latvia, Lithuania, and the
Ukraine),' 3 6 it must obtain most of the relevant documents and testimony through Soviet cooperation.' 3 7 Defendants normally challenge
the use of this evidence on two grounds. First, defendants argue that
the Soviet Union has a strong state interest in achieving their conviction
and a history of fabricating evidence for such ends.
Most targets of OSI prosecutions are naturalized Americans of Latvian , Lithuanian, or Ukrainian descent. 138 One argument as to the
nature of the Soviet Union's interest in their prosecutions runs as follows. All three Soviet republics have a history of ethnic nationalism and
recalcitrance to centralized state control.
To combat this particularism, the Soviet government has used various means to foster feelings of friendship between these smaller ethnic
groups and the Russian people, including promotion of the Soviet role
in liberating these countries from the Germans during the "Great Patriotic War." Part of this effort involves branding as "Nazi collaborators"
those who engaged in independence struggles, and thus discrediting
132. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp 893, 899 S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597
F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). The district court judge added
that

in view of the similarity in the burden of proof between criminal cases and
denaturalization cases, and in view of what is at stake for the naturalized
American citizen, the defendant in a denaturalization case ought to have the
same resources that are provided a defendant in a criminal case ... in short
the naturalized citizen-provided the defendant's financial condition warrants it-should receive the benefit of court-appointed counsel and other
experts at the Government's expense.

Id.
133.
134.
135.
§ 4, at

Walus, 616 F.2d at 303 n.52.
Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 896.
Clines, Once Again Into That Ashen Night of History, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987,
3, col. 1.

136. Note, Denaturalizationof Suspected Nazi War Criminals: The Problem of Soviet Source
Evidence, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 365 (1986). Of those OSI defendants whose
national origin is known, well over half are from Soviet republics. See generally newsletter, Americans for Due Process, supra note 4.
137. See generally id.
138. Note, supra note 136, at 366 n.2.
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6migr6s with fabricated or exaggerated charges of war crimes. 139
Some judges accept the argument that its state interest may lead the
Soviet government to fabricate evidence. In United States v. Kungys, the
district court judge noted:
In these circumstances OSI received from the Soviet authorities the product of the KGB investigation ...we also are faced with the fact that the
Soviet Union uses special procedures in political cases such as this which,
on occasion at least, result in false or distorted evidence
in order to
140
achieve the result which the state interest requires.
In United States v. Kowalchuk, 14 1 the district court judge held that "there
is ample support in the record for the proposition that false or exaggerated accusations have often been employed by the Soviet government
as a political weapon." 1 4 2 Other courts, however, reject such blanket
characterizations, laying the burden of showing evidence of coercion or
forgery on defendants, 14 3 even though defendants may have no access
139. These arguments are developed and evaluated at greater length in Note, supra
note 136, at 365-66 n.2. For a description of Soviet methods of discrediting 6migr6s,
see United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104, 1124 (D. NJ. 1983), rev'd, 793 F.2d
516 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 431 (1986).
Three witnesses, whose testimony was submitted in deposition form or in the
form of testimony from other trials, described the steps the Soviet Union has
taken to counter the influence of 6migr6s from the Baltic states.
Lesinskis, born in Latvia, studied at the Moscow institute for International
Relations and after working briefly in Latvia returned to Moscow for KGB
training. The KGB (the State Security Committee) has a central headquarters in Moscow where it is attached to the Council of Ministers, and it has a
similar headquarters in each of the federal republics, including Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
Lesinskis worked for the KGB from 1956 to 1978 when he defected. One
of his early assignments was with "Motherland's Voice", an agency engaging
in propaganda designed to discredit Latvian emigres abroad by characterizing them as war criminals or collaborators during the German occupation-or
by characterizing them as acting under orders of western intelligence agencies. Sometimes the charges were true; sometimes they were fabricated.
In 1964 there was formed the Latvian Committee for Cultural Relations of
Latvians abroad, and during 1970-76 Lesinskis was chairman of its presidium, receiving instructions from the KGB. Its objective was also to discredit
Latvian emigres, particularly those who actively sought the end of the Soviet
occupation. This was accomplished by publication of books and articles purporting to describe the war crimes and collaboration of which emigres were
guilty. The facts were often embellished and supplemented with forged documents, false testimony and pure invention. When he was assigned to a post
in the United States, Lesinskis' job was to obtain information about Latvian
communities abroad, to promote discord within them and to discredit their
leaders. All of this was a KGB function.
Id. at 1124.
140. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. at 1126.

141. 571 F. Supp. 72, 78 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
142. Id.
143. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd,
680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982). See also United States
v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986) (trial judge admitted, over defendant's objec-
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to such evidence.
Defendants also contend that the kinds of evidence used-documents and depositions--do not allow the investigation and challenge
usually possible in American courts, thereby creating problems of due
process. For example, in the deposition process (the Soviet government
so far has not allowed witnesses to testify at trial in the United
States),1 45 a Soviet government procurator presides over the proceedings. The procurator's presence may intimidate witnesses into saying
only what the government has told them to say. 146 Moreover, although
the defendant may have his lawyer present at the deposition, this is an
expensive option for defendants of limited means who are not entitled
to counsel at government expense. 147 If the lawyer is not present, however, the courts have tended to rule that the defendant's "choice" waives
any right to challenge the deposition's fairness. 148 If the defendant's
lawyer does attend, the procurator has reportedly barred certain lines of
49
cross-examination that would be allowed in an American trial.'
Another problem results from the Soviet government's refusal to
grant defendants or their attorneys access to potential witnesses or documentation. One district court judge described this Soviet practice as
follows:
Neither the government nor the defendant was permitted to interview
other persons in Soviet-controlled territory having knowledge of the
facts, or even to visit Lubomyl, where a great many persons familiar with
the events still reside. The notion that only selected witnesses favorable
to the government have been permitted to testify (and with the opportunity for informed and meaningful cross-examination severely restricted)
1 50
is not easily squared with accepted concepts of due process of law.
The judge refused to accept the testimony "for the most part," instead
revoking the defendant's citizenship on the basis of his own
testimony. '51
Courts have split with respect to the treatment of Soviet-source evidence. While some courts are troubled by such evidence, 152 other
tions, Lithuanian documents as self-authenticating, ancient documents). See Note,
supra note 136, at 368-69 n.7.
144. "[O]f course, no defendant in any such case has had the opportunity to investigate the circumstances under which the KGB and procurator prepared the wit-

nesses for interrogation by the OSI." Kungys, 571 F. Supp. at 1126.
145. Note, supra note 136, at 373 n.27.

146. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. at 1127; see also Note, supra note 136, at 375-78, for a
more detailed discussion.
147. See Comment, supra note 6, at 88.
148. United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426, 434 (E.D. N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 685
F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982); United States v. Palciauskas, 559
F. Supp. 1294, 1297 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 625 (11 th Cir. 1985); see
Note, supra note 136, at 376-77.
149. Note, supra note 136, at 376-77.
150. United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
151. Id.

152. United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 1985); Laipenieks v.
I.N.S., 750 F.2d 1427, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp.
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courts have found the deposed testimony of Soviet witnesses to be credible, dismissing defendants' claims that Soviet documents were forged or
witnesses coerced.' 5 3 Courts have yet to find a way of treating Soviet
source evidence so that the concerns of both prosecution and defense
are met.15 4 Because higher courts have not resolved the divergent treatment of Soviet source evidence, both OSI and the defense remain at the
mercy of a particular judge's, or circuit's, approach. 155
M.

Analysis: The Problem of Avoiding a Trial on the Merits

The United States's decision to actively pursue alleged Nazi war
criminals, coupled with its refusal to accept jurisdiction to try them
domestically on the merits of the war crimes charges, 15 6 inadvertently
has created a combination of procedures that never focus on the relative

culpability of different defendants. A defendant could receive the death
sentence without ever having a fair trial on the merits. The general due
process inadequacies of all denaturalization proceedings, 15 7 the use of
Soviet-source evidence, 15 8 and the removal of the power of equitable
1104, 1123 (D.N.J. 1983), aft'd, 743 F.2d 516 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct.
431 (1986); United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 79-80 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aft'd,
en banc 773 F.2d 488 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1012 (1986). See generally
Note, supra note 136, at 378-87.
153. United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25, 31-32 (S.D. Fla. 1982) aft'd, 728 F.2d
1314 (1 1th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984); United States v. Linnas, 527 F.
Supp. 426, 433-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), af'd, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 883 (1982); United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 89-90 (E.D. Pa.

1981).
154. See Koziy, 728 F.2d at 1322, where the appeals court held:
The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, add support to the district court's
finding that the anmeldung and the abmeldung were properly authenticated.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 902(3), a document is self-authenticated if it purports
"to be executed or attested in his official capacity by a person authorized by
the laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation, and
accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature
and official position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or (B) of any
foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of
genuineness of signature and official position relating to the execution or
attestation." A Russian official authorized to authenticate such documents
attested to the anmeldung and the abmeldung. These documents, therefore,
were self authenticated under rule 902(3). Since there was competent evidence in the record to support the district court's finding that the anmeldung
and the abmeldung were properly authenticated, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by allowing them into evidence.
One can imagine many cases, involving many countries, where such reasoning could
produce frightening results.
Contrast the above with United States v. Kungys, where the judge admitted the Lithuanian depositions only for the limited purpose of establishing that killings occurred
at Kedainiai in July and August of 1941, but not as evidence that the defendant participated in those killings. Kungys, 571 F.Supp. at 1132-33.
155. See Note, supra note 136, at 378-92.
156. See Comment, supra note 6, at 43 n.13.
157. See supra notes 109-35 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 136-55 and accompanying text.
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The
discretion from district court judges exacerbate the problem.
160
and the severity of
lack of public sympathy for war crimes defendants
the ultimate sanction-often the death penalty, 16 1 make these systemic
failures even more troubling.
Moreover, the system puts many who fled Europe at risk. The Justice Department's stated policy is to not pursue possibly fraudulent procurement of citizenship once the individual has conducted himself as a
good citizen for many years, unless that person's removal from the
United States will protect "the body politic."' 162 The OSI defendant,
however, once charged with war crimes, faces an inexorable prosecution
of any immigration irregularity, even though such an irregularity would
not be pursued if it came to light absent the war crimes charges.

A.

The Scope of the Problem: The Fedorenko Case

Feodor Fedorenko, a Ukrainian, entered the United States in 1949 on a
DPA visa, and became a naturalized citizen in 1970.163 In order to gain
initial access to the United States, Fedorenko concealed information that
as a prisoner of war he served as an armed guard in the Nazi concentra16 4
tion camp at Treblinka, Poland.
159. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
160. For example, in one OSI case, the Jewish Defense League ran ads in local
newspapers offering chartered buses to the situs of the trial on opening day. A demonstration outside the courtroom ensued with the chant: "Who do we want?
Fedorenko. How do we want him? Dead." United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp.
893, 899 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1978). In addition, a memorial service for the dead at the
Treblinka concentration camp (where the defendant had served as a guard) was held
in a park outside the court building. Id. at 900 n. 11.
161. Fedorenko was executed in the Soviet Union. Infra note 185. Karl Linnas
also faced execution at the time of his deportation. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1987, at BI,
col. 5.
162. The Department ofJustice's guidelines for bringing denaturalization suits are
as follows:
The legislation referred to [denaturalization], being retroactive, is construed
to be remedial rather than penal in its nature; for the protection of the body
politic rather than for the punishment of the individuals concerned. Ordinarily, nothing less than the betterment of the citizenship of the country should
be regarded as sufficient to justify the disturbance of personal and property
rights which cancellation proceedings may occasion. This does not mean that
such proceedings should not be instituted in any case where willful and deliberate fraud appears, as the perpetration of such fraud would indicate lack of
the moral qualifications necessary for citizenship. If, however, many years
have elapsed since the judgment of naturalization was apparently so procured, and the party has since conducted himself as a good citizen and possesses the necessary qualifications for citizenship, cancellation proceedings
should not, as a rule, be instituted.
United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 898-99 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (quoting
Dept. ofJustice Circular Letter No. 107 (Sept. 20, 1909), reprintedin Immigration and
Naturalization Service Handbook at 6508, 08.1). Note that the government's failure
to follow the Department ofJustice's policies does not bar the bringing of a denaturalization suit. See United States v. Melligan, 573 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978).
163. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 911.
164. Id. at 895-96.
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In 1978, based on evidence of this concealment, the U.S. government filed a seven-count indictment in a federal district court, charging
that Fedorenko illegally procured his citizenship by giving false information on his visa application. 1 6 5 The indictment also charged that
Fedorenko failed to disclose his participation in war atrocities and that
166
he lacked the "good moral character required to become a citizen."
In response, Fedorenko claimed that he had served only as a perimeter
guard who patrolled the fence and served in the guard tower, 16 7 and
that he had performed his duties involuntarily while a prisoner of
war. 168
The district court judge ruled that the government fell "woefully
short" of proving Fedorenko's participation in war atrocities by the
required standard of "clear and convincing proof."1 69 With respect to
the government's claim that Fedorenko misrepresented facts on his citizenship application, the court held that Fedorenko's concealment of his
Treblinka service did not constitute a misrepresentation of "material
70
fact" that would have justified denaturalization under the Chaunt test.'
Alternatively, the court held that even if Fedorenko's omissions were
sufficiently material to justify denaturalization, "equitable and mitigating" circumstances should permit him to retain his citizenship.' 7 1 Such
circumstances included the unproven nature of the war crimes allegations and Fedorenko's 29 years as a responsible U.S. resident and citizen.1 72 Adding to the weight of the equities in Fedorenko's favor was
that "[h]e was a victim of Nazi aggression, fearful of repatriation, many
years and many miles from a home he thought to be empty of his wife
165. Id. at 897.
166. See id. at 897-98. Specifically, the government produced witnesses who testified that Fedorenko committed specific acts of murder and brutality against Treblinka camp inmates. Id. at 901-03.
167. See id. at 903-04.
168. Id. at 898.
169. Id. at 909. Judge Roettger found Fedorenko far more credible than the eyewitness testimony, which he found untrustworthy for several reasons. He concluded,
"[t]he evidence left the court with suspicions about whether defendant participated
in atrocities at Treblinka but they were only suspicions." Id. The court was clear,
however, about its duty if Fedorenko had committed atrocities. "If the court were
convinced that the allegations charging defendant with atrocities at Treblinka were

true, there is no doubt that defendant would not be entitled to citizenship in a country which prides itself on its adherence to principles of equality and human dignity."
Id. at 920.
170. See id. at 914-17. For a discussion of the Chaunt materiality test in denaturalization proceedings, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. The district court
adopted the Third and Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Chaunt text, under which
a fact suppressed or misstated is not material unless the truth, if known, would have

justified denial of citizenship. See, e.g., United States v. Riela, 337 F.2d 986 (3d Cir.
1964); United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962). The court held that
Fedorenko's guard service, if known, would not necessarily justify denial of citizen-

ship. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 916-17.
171. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 920.

172. Fedorenko had acquired a reputation as a conscientious and able worker at a
Waterbury, Connecticut factory.
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73
and children, and was longing for a chance in America."'
The Fifth Circuit reversed on appeal, 174 holding that Fedorenko's
failure to fully disclose his war-time activities constituted a misrepresentation of material fact on his citizenship application, 17 5 and, further, that
the judge possessed no discretion to permit equitable factors to excuse
fraudulent procurement of U.S. citizenship.' 76 The Supreme Court
affirmed the denaturalization order. 17 7 Rather than consider the proper
application of the Chaunt materiality standard to Fedorenko's citizenship
application,' 78 the Supreme Court ruled as a matter of law that U.S.
authorities could not have given the defendant a visa under the Displaced Persons Act had they known of the defendant's guard service.
Because Fedorenko's visa was not valid, it was illegally procured, and
therefore revocable.' 79 Most important for this Note, the Court held
that equitable factors cannot prevent denaturalization once a court
establishes illegal or fraudulent procurement of citizenship.' 8 0 In
ordering Fedorenko's denaturalization, neither the Supreme Court nor
the Fifth Circuit questioned the trial court's finding that the evidence
was insufficient to support the war crimes charge.' 8 '
Once denaturalized, Fedorenko became subject to deportation. In
the deportation proceeding, the Board of Immigration Appeals held
Fedorenko's actions as a guard for the Nazis constituted assistance of
persecution whether he personally did or did not abuse, mistreat, or
exterminate any individuals.' 8 2 He was therefore deportable under the
Holtzman Amendment, regardless of whether his guard service was voluntary, and regardless of the possibility that as a Ukrainian, he might be
persecuted upon his return to the Soviet Union.' 8 3 In 1984, after Canada refused to accept Fedorenko,' 8 4 the United States deported him to
the Soviet Union where, in a widely publicized trial, he pled guilty to all
charges and was sentenced to death.' 8 5 The Soviet Union executed

173. Id. at 920-21.
174. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1979).
175. The Fifth Circuit Court refused to adopt the Third and Ninth Circuit interpretation of the Chaunt test, discussed supra note 169. Instead, the court held the
government need only prove "by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of
true facts would have led the government to make an inquiry that might have uncovered other facts warranting denial of citizenship." Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 951. Based
on this analysis of the Chaunt test, Fedorenko was guilty of misrepresentation and
concealment of material facts because "had [he] disclosed his guard service, the
American authorities would have conducted an inquiry that might have resulted in
denial of a visa." Id. at 953.
176. Id. at 953-54.
177. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
178. See supra notes 170 and 175.
179. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 513-16.

180. Id. at 517.
181. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505 n.24.
182. Matter of Fedorenko, Interim Decision 2963 (BIA 1984), at 16-18.
183. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
184. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1984, § A, at 12, col. 3.
185. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1986, § A, at 2, col. 5.
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Fedorenko in 1987.186
B.

Procedural Consequences of Avoiding Jurisdiction Over Accused
War Criminals
The Fedorenko case highlights several procedural consequences of the
United States's failure to assert jurisdiction to try OSI defendants for
their alleged war crimes. The current denaturalization and deportation
process, as it affects accused war criminals, disregards the failure to
prove complicity of war crimes, so long as the government establishes
improper procurement of U.S. citizenship.18 7 Furthermore, the denaturalization procedure prohibits courts from considering countervailing
equitable factors and disregards the high probability that OSI defendants will not receive a fair trial if deported to the Soviet Union and other
states whose interest in convicting such defendants is strong.188
1.

Irrelevance to the Deportation Decision of Failure to Prove War Crimes
In prosecuting alleged Nazi war criminals, OSI normally alleges both the
commission of war crimes and the misrepresentation or concealment of
material facts. The OSI, however, need only establish either allegation
by "clear and convincing" proof to win its case. 1 8 9 An accused war
criminal can absolve himself of war crimes charges yet nevertheless be
denaturalized for having misrepresented himself as a displaced person
to obtain a DPA visa.
By statute, the Attorney General cannot deport a denaturalized
alien to a country where the alien's "life or freedom would be
threatened" due to considerations such as race, religion, or nationality.190 Arguably, this relief could apply to OSI defendants from the Baltic States and the Ukraine. However, the Attorney General must deport
an alien not deportable under the "life or freedom" exception if the
Attorney General determines the alien "ordered, incited, assisted or
otherwise participated" in persecution. 19 ' As interpreted by the Board
of Immigration Appeals, "it is the objective effect of an alien's actions
which is controlling," even if the individual did not directly participate
in persecution, or the conduct was involuntarily undertaken.' 9 2 Thus,
immigration officials must deport the OSI defendant unless the defendant can show not only that he was entirely innocent of all war crimes, but
186. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, § I, at A3, col. 5. The official announcement did

not indicate when the execution occurred. Id.
187. No court has explicitly said this, but the result inevitably follows from the
Supreme Court's Fedorenko decision. By leaving undisturbed the district court's
"acquittal" of war crimes, but nevertheless ordering deportation, the Court created
two, independent prongs for denaturalization and deportation.
188. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 920; Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 513-16. See also text
accompanying notes 171-72.
189. 3 GORDON &ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, at § 20.5d(3). See also supra note 187.
190. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(h) (Supp. 1987).
191. Act of Oct. 30, 1978. See supra note 58.

192. Matter of Fedorenko, Interim Decision 2963 (BIA 1984), at 17. See also Matter of Laipenieks, Interim Decision 2949 (BIA 1983).
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that he did not collaborate, voluntarily or involuntarily, with any group
that persecuted others.
The Consequences of Avoiding Jurisdiction
The procedural framework governing the denaturalization and deportation of citizens accused of war crimes raises doubt about the effectiveness and fairness of the current system. The United States legal system
concerns itself with accused war criminals only to the extent that the
standards for denaturalization and deportation can or cannot be satisfied. This inflexible approach treats all defendants charged with war
crimes the same, regardless of their level of subjective culpability and
the involuntariness of their participation. By avoiding jurisdiction,
United States courts lose the power to weigh the nature of a defendant's
actions (i.e., interrogating suspects for the police vs. participation in
mass murder), the level of a defendant's subjective moral culpability,
and any extenuating circumstances (i.e., an 18-year old prisoner of war
ordered to act as a camp guard may deserve more lenient treatment than
a volunteer for the SS).193 The United States avoids the responsibility
of providing punishments proportionate to the particular crimes
committed.
2.

Vesting in a PoliticalOfficial the Sole Power to Predicate a Decision Upon
Innocence of War Crimes or Mild Culpability
In general, the Attorney General has final authority to determine which
aliens will be deported. 19 4 The Attorney General's discretion remains
the sole'hope of an OSI defendant not found guilty of war crimes but
guilty of misrepresentation or illegal procurement of entry. No court
has passed on how the Act of Oct. 30, 1978, merges into the Attorney
General's pre-existing statutory mandate to refuse to deport aliens facing persecution.' 9 5 The effect of the two statutes together would seem
to still give the Attorney General power to block deportation of an OSI
defendant if the Attorney General determined both that the alien did
not participate in persecution, and that upon deportation he would be
persecuted.
Although the above interpretation gives the OSI defendant innocent of war crimes a chance of avoiding a probable death sentence, such
a solution to an otherwise egregious miscarriage ofjustice is inadequate.
The Attorney General is a political appointee, responsive to political
pressures. Many Attorneys General would find it extremely awkward to
generate headlines like "Attorney General Rescues Accused Nazi War
Criminal." The political pressure would increase if the Board of Immi-

3.

193. In a trial on the merits, the judge orjury always weighs such factors in deciding whether to find the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense, or in applying
sentencing discretion.
194. This power arises from the Attorney General's statutory authority to prevent

deportation of an alien he believes will be persecuted upon deportation. See supra
notes 57, 190. Such a decision is inherently discretionary.
195. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(h) (Supp. 1987).

1988

Nazi War Criminal Deportation

gration Appeals had found that the defendant "objectively" assisted in
persecution, even though he may not have directly participated in any
persecutions, or may have acted only under duress. Moreover, such a
decision by a member of the Executive Branch would be a direct insult
to the Soviet Union, possibly conflicting with important foreign policy
concerns. These political considerations should not decide such cases.
The power should rest with courts, insulated from political concerns,
96
able to weigh the individual merits of the case.'
IV. The Deficiency of Already Proposed Solutions
Commentators have proposed two solutions to the due process deficiencies in Nazi war crimes prosecutions. One proposal suggests giving
defendants a trial by jury on the factual issue of misrepresentation, providing assistance of counsel at government expense if needed, and,
establishing a code for the denaturalization procedure merging elements from the traditionally separate spheres of civil and criminal
law. 197 A second proposal advocates reconvening the Nuremberg

98
Tribunals. 1

The proposals have differing shortcomings. Although creation of
an international tribunal to try war criminals could be a satisfactory solu196. The Attorney General's power is analogous to a governor's power to commute a death sentence, or a presidential amnesty or pardon. This Note does not
argue that the Attorney General should be stripped of this power, only that a "commutation stage" should not be the only place where the merits are considered. When
a governor commutes a death sentence, this occurs after the defendant has received a
trial and a sentence for the crime of which he is accused. OSI defendants never
receive such a trial.
197. See Comment, supra note 6, at 88.
198. Lippman, supra note 84, at 212. The Nuremberg (Nurnberg) trials resulted
from a London agreement between the four main Allies on Aug. 8, 1945, which
included a charter for an international military tribunal for the trial of the major Axis
war criminals whose offenses had no particular location. Nineteen other governments later adhered to the agreement. The trials lasted more than ten months,
resulting in twelve sentences of death by hanging, three sentences of life imprisonment, four prison sentences ranging from ten to twenty years, and three acquittals.
The London agreement and charter contemplated a series of trials by the international military tribunal. Associate Justice Robert Jackson of the United States
Supreme Court, one of the chief prosecutors, recommended against such proceedings, arguing that the remaining defendants could be tried by each occupying power
in its own zone of occupation for single and specific crimes. Over 2,000 subsequent
trials are estimated to have taken place involving many times that number of defendants (but this estimate does not include trials by the Soviet Union and the Eastern
European countries, for which even approximations are unavailable).
From their very outset these trials were controversial. One of the most frequently
advanced legal arguments against the program was that the war crimes trials were ex
post facto, punishing acts that had not been criminal when they were committed.
Against this view, the Nuremberg tribunal held that a series of international declarations, acts, and treaties, ratified by Germany and nearly all other states, had established a rule of customary international law. See War Crimes, 12 NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, 491 (1987). JusticeJackson expressed the argument this way: "We propose to punish acts which have been regarded as criminal since the time of Cain and
have been so written in every civilized code." See Comment, supra note 6, at 39-40
n.2.
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tion, the major international initiative required to create it is not apparently forthcoming. 199 The proposal suggesting the establishment of
due process safeguards has merit for general denaturalization cases but
does not address the specific problems of the Nazi war crimes prosecutions. The additional safeguards would not help an alleged Nazi war
criminal who is innocent of war crimes but whose illegal entry itself nevertheless makes him deportable.
V.

Fairness Proposals

Two different approaches could lessen the potential risk that alleged war
criminals will be shuffled through the denaturalization process and
deported to a country where they will be deprived of due process protections. First, Congress could simply assert jurisdiction in war crimes
cases, trying and punishing the alleged criminals domestically. Alternatively, the United States could adopt a procedure to ensure that only
those alleged war criminals guilty of war crimes are deported. This proposal requires an actual trial on the war crimes issue for defendants who
meet specific requirements.
A.

Proposal to Assert Jurisdiction

The United States may, consistent with international law, assert jurisdiction to try alleged war criminals domestically. Canada, for example, is
already following this route. 20 0 The universality basis of jurisdiction
authorizes any nation to punish persons guilty of universally condemned
crimes, deeming some crimes so important that nexus is necessary
between the nation and the defendant. 20 1 Although traditionally
asserted in piracy and slave trade cases, nations have used this basis of
jurisdiction more recently for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. 20 2 The United States has never used universality jurisdiction
to prosecute a Nazi war criminal, but the United States has recognized
the legitimacy of its use in such cases by allowing Israel to use universal20
ity jurisdiction to extradite John Demjanjuk.
199. This author's search of the literature has found no call for a renewed Nuremberg tribunal other than Lippman's.
200. N.Y. Times, March 13, 1987, § I, at Al, col. 1.
201. M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 262
(1974). Most theories ofjurisdiction require a link between the state assertingjurisdiction and the individual, such as situs of the offense, or nationality of the offense.
Id at 261-62. Under the universality theory, the gravamen of the offense is such that
it constitutes an offense against mankind. Id. at 262.
202. Id. at 263, 266-67.
203. In fact, the district court and court of appeals in the Demjanjuk extradition

trial found that the United States had specifically incorporated the universality principle into the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-85 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986); In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555-58 (N.D. Ohio
1985); see also Reiss, supra note 19, at 298.

Israel used a municipal law to criminalize Demjanjuk's offense, the Nazis and Nazi
Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710, 57 SEFER HAHUKIM 281 (1950). The law
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B.

Nazi War Criminal Deportation

Proposal to Prove Guilt Before Deporting

When the OSI launches denaturalization proceedings on the basis of
alleged Nazi war crimes, the Justice Department should require as an
initial matter that the OSI either:
(a) present a request for extradition from a country with whom the
United States has an extradition treaty, or
(b) state that the Justice Department ultimately seeks deportation rather
than extradition.
If (a) applies, the courts would proceed as they always have with extradition requests. However, if (b) applies, OSI would be required to specify
the probable country of destination if deportation occurs. Then, before
the deportation proceeding could begin, the Secretary of State would be
required to certify that the destination country would provide the
defendant a trial with adequate due process protections.
If the Secretary of State could not so certify, the defendant would
then receive a U.S. trial specifically upon the war crimes issue, providing
criminal procedure due process protections. Because under this alternative the United States would not be exercising jurisdiction, such
defendants could not be punished for war crimes in the United States.
However, justice dictates that before a U.S. court sends a defendant to
face trial in an untrustworthy judicial system, that court should be cer-

tain the defendant is guilty of the crimes for which he will likely be
punished.
This proposal would require at least two statutory reforms. Congress would need to amend the Act of October 30, 1978 to implement
the changes. Concomitantly, Congress would need to establish appropriate penalties for defendants like Fedorenko and Kungys, who have
violated U.S. law but do not deserve deportation.
C.

The Two Proposals: Discussion

The United States should adopt the first proposal and assert jurisdiction, although the second proposal is also narrowly tailored to address
the problem. Under the second proposal, alleged war criminals would
continue to be deported or extradited to appropriate countries, such as
West Germany and Israel, to receive trials. Moreover, all defendants
who the United States canprove to be war criminals would continue to be

deported wherever, without regard for their subsequent fate. However,
those whom the United States could not prove committed war crimes
could not be deported unless a country could be found that would not

persecute them. Those remaining in the United States would then be
suitably punished for the fraud they practiced on the U.S. government.
criminalizes, interalia, crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. Reiss, supra note 19, at 283 n.7. States may also define their rights and
duties by treaties allowing universal jurisdiction, such as the Geneva Convention of
the High Seas. Id. at 302.
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Despite the above-described attempts to narrowly tailor a deportation solution, actual assertion ofjurisdiction has one decisive advantage.
Under current U.S. law, "assistance" in Nazi war crimes is given a broad
interpretation, covering kinds of persons whose moral culpability can
vary widely: members of police forces in Nazi-dominated conquered
states, prisoners of war drafted to be perimeter guards for the death
camps (many of them eighteen year old youths at the time), those camp
guards who actually herded prisoners to their death, and those notorious guards who took special pleasure in inflicting additional pain or
humiliation upon the inmates. Asserting jurisdiction would allow the
United States to distinguish levels of culpability, punishing the most culpable most harshly.
In contrast, the deportation solution might lead to allowing those of
mild or moderate culpability to remain in the United States. Although
these would be punished in some way for illegal procurement of entry,
they could not be prosecuted for their participation in crimes against
humanity. Such a solution would be offensive to many people. A mere
perimeter camp guard may not deserve being deported to a death sentence, but his level of moral culpability might nevertheless require some
form of punishment. Society must uphold certain moral norms of individual responsibility, including its expectation of certain standards of
conduct in even the most exigent circumstances.
VI. Conclusion
American laxity in seeking out and prosecuting war criminals who took
advantage of lenient post-war immigration policies is no longer acceptable. The Act of October 30, 1978 and the founding of the OSI were
belated but progressive corrections. Unfortunately, longstanding due
process inadequacies in U.S. denaturalization procedure, and the unique
problems resulting from deportation of alleged war criminals, create
potential dangers to some American citizens. By attempting to right one
injustice the system may create new injustices. A balance must be struck
so that, in pursuing the guilty, disproportionate punishment is not
inflicted upon the innocent or the less culpable.
GregoryJ. Getschman

